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THE ROLE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND DATA NETWORK EFFECTS 
FOR CREATING USER VALUE 
Some of the world’s most profitable firms own platforms that exhibit network effects. A 
platform exhibits network effects if the more that people use it, the more valuable it becomes to 
each user. Theorizing about the value perceived by users of a platform that exhibits network 
effects has traditionally focused on direct and indirect network effects. In this paper, we theorize 
about a new category of network effects—data network effects—that has emerged from 
advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and the growing availability of data. A platform exhibits 
data network effects if the more that the platform learns from the data it collects on users, the 
more valuable the platform becomes to each user. We argue that there is a positive direct 
relationship between the AI capability of a platform and the value perceived in the platform by 











Network effects make crucial contributions to the value that users perceive in the products, 
services, or platforms of some of the world’s most valuable firms (e.g., Apple, Microsoft, 
Facebook). A platform or one of its products or services exhibits network effects if the more that 
people use it, the more valuable it becomes to each user (Church & Gandal, 1992; Farrell & 
Saloner, 1985, 1986; Katz & Shapiro, 1985, 1986, 1992; Sheremata, 2004; Suarez, 2005). For 
example, a social network such as Facebook exhibits network effects because the more that people 
use it, the more valuable it becomes to each user since more users mean more people to interact 
with (Afuah, 2013; Van Alstyne, Parker, & Choudary, 2016). Because of the immense impact that 
network effects can have on the value that users perceive in a platform, many scholars have 
theorized about their nature and consequences for user value (Cennamo & Santalo, 2013; 
Eisenmann, Parker, & Van Alstyne, 2011; Gawer, 2009; Majumdar & Venkataraman, 1998; 
Mcintyre & Srinivasan, 2017; Mcintyre, Srinivasan, Afuah, Gawer, & Krestschmer, 2020; Parker 
& Van Alstyne, 2005; Priem, Butler, & Li, 2013; Rochet & Tirole, 2003). 
To date, research has focused on two categories of network effects: direct network effects 
and indirect network effects (Clements, 2004; Mcintyre & Srinivasan, 2017). In the case of direct 
network effects, the value that users derive from a network comes from users being able to interact 
directly with each other (Rochet & Tirole, 2003; Zhu & Iansiti, 2012). For example, network 
effects on social media platforms primarily stem from users interacting directly with each other. 
In the case of indirect network effects, the more people that use a product, the higher is the 
likelihood of increased availability and variety of complements of the product, thereby increasing 
the value of the product to each user (Boudreau, 2012; Church, Gandal, Krause, & Canada, 2008; 
Clements & Ohashi, 2005). For example, the more users that are attracted to a mobile ecosystem, 
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the greater are the incentives for development and thus the diversity of apps, resulting in more 
perceived user value of products within that mobile ecosystem. In sum, extant research has 
effectively explored the impact of network effects on the value perceived by users in terms of both 
direct and indirect network effects. 
However, little attention has been paid to data network effects as an emerging category of 
network effects. A platform exhibits data network effects if, the more that the platform learns 
from the data it collects on users, the more valuable the platform becomes to each user. For 
example, the more that Google learns about users and the searches that they conduct, the more it 
can individualize the experience, making the search engine more valuable to each user. 
Similarly, the more that Tesla optimizes its self-driving algorithms by feeding them with billions 
of miles worth of driving data it gathers from in-car sensors, cameras, and radar units, the greater 
is the perceived value of Tesla cars. 
In this paper, we explore the role of artificial intelligence (AI) and data network effects 
for creating user value, especially in the context of multi-sided platforms. The starting point is 
the observation that the value each user perceives depends on the scale of data-driven learning 
and improvements realized with AI. Such learning and improvements typically rely on faster and 
better predictions through applications of machine learning grounded in data (Agrawal, Gans, & 
Goldfarb, 2018; Samuel, 1959). For example, music streaming services use machine learning 
techniques to continuously learn about users’ listening preferences and improve their 
recommendation engine, making the platform more valuable to each user. 
Assuming direct connections and multi-sided exchange between users or user groups 
(e.g., Farrell & Saloner, 1985; Katz & Shapiro, 1985), prior network effects literature cannot 
readily explain why data-driven learning and improvements on a platform contributes to user 
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value through data network effects. In this research, we therefore examine the role of AI and the 
“computer in the middle of every transaction” (Varian, 2014, p. 1) to address the following 
research question: how is value for each user of the platform created from data with AI?  
We develop a model of data network effects that complements and extends existing 
network effects theory (Cennamo & Santalo, 2013; Church et al., 2008; Farrell & Saloner, 1986; 
Katz & Shapiro, 1986; Parker & Van Alstyne, 2005; Rochet & Tirole, 2003). Based on the 
premise of same-side or multi-sided exchange among users, network effects theory posits that a 
growing network of interconnected users gives rise to network externalities, where a user’s 
utility of a platform is a function of the total number of users (Katz & Shapiro, 1985). In this 
paper, we propose that platform AI capability, i.e., the ability of a platform to learn from data to 
continuously improve its products or services for each user, gives rise to new platform 
externalities, where a user’s utility of a platform is a function of the scale of data-driven learning 
and improvements realized with AI. These improvements manifest in greater product 
functionality, platform quality, and experience for each user (Cennamo & Santalo, 2013; 
Cennamo & Santaló, 2018; Himan, 2002; Mcintyre & Srinivasan, 2017; Zhu & Iansiti, 2012; 
Zhu & Liu, 2018). Our model of data network effects explains this novel phenomenon. 
 
CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
Before presenting the model, we first summarize the background information about 
artificial intelligence and network effects that is needed to understand the causal arguments of 
the model. 
Artificial Intelligence 
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Brian Arthur (2009) proposes three principles through which we can understand advanced 
technologies such as AI: combination, recursiveness, and phenomena. First, while AI pioneers in 
the 1950s such as John McCarthy, Marvin Minsky, Nathaniel Rochester, and Claude Shannon 
projected that “every aspect of learning or any other feature of intelligence can in principle be so 
precisely described that a machine can be made to simulate it” (McCorduck, 2004), today’s 
application of AI exhibits a more modest ambition by combining technologies in particular 
functional domains (Raisch & Krakowski, 2020). Advances in machine learning offer a novel 
approach to specific decision-making tasks and business problems (Finlay, 2017). In turn, such 
machine learning draws on the dramatically improved performance-price ratio of computer 
processing technology, data storage and management, and network technologies (Agrawal et al., 
2018; Yoo, Henfridsson, & Lyytinen, 2010). In combination, these technologies make AI an 
important tool for enabling platforms, products, or services to generate user value. For example, 
navigation services leverage data collected about users to offer dynamic turn-by-turn navigation 
based on continuously improved predictions of traffic situations. The perceived value for each user 
increases as predictions benefit from the increasing processing and networking power of 
computing devices such as smartphones. 
Second, AI applications exhibit a modular architecture (Garud & Karnøe, 2003; Schilling, 
2000) making up a complex network of technologies where each technology is developed 
independently with its own set of design objectives. This creates recursiveness that influences the 
perceived user value of the service employing AI. AI consists of technologies, which in turn consist 
of technologies. As improvements in one piece of technology are accomplished, this may conflict 
with the design objectives of another piece of technology. For instance, consider how the 
improvements in the recommendation engine of a service may improve its convenience, 
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personalization, and ease of use. However, the improvements in the engine may cause privacy 
concerns and require improvements in privacy protection and the cybersecurity technology used. 
In fact, in the wake of recursiveness, firms leveraging AI may face scrutiny from key stakeholder 
audiences regarding their collection and use of personal data, the lack of transparency in their 
decisions (e.g., automated loan decision-making), and how they deal with the errors stemming 
from biases oftentimes inherited when algorithms use data collected on users (Ahsen, Ayvaci, & 
Raghunathan, 2019). 
Finally, resonating with Arthur’s third principle, that of phenomena, today’s AI has data-
driven learning at its center (Meyer et al., 2014). For example, rather than programming explicit 
rules for recognizing a cat or a dog, neural networks (a form of machine learning algorithms) are 
capable of teaching themselves classification if trained with a prelabeled dataset. In practice, 
training machine learning algorithms involves much tinkering and experimentation, iteratively 
learning from data to detect patterns and predict outcomes faster and more accurately (Agrawal et 
al., 2018). In this regard, the value of AI technologies is based on the existence of big data (McAfee 
& Brynjolfsson, 2012; Varian, 2014). Big data refers to very large volumes of data, the ability to 
process and transmit that data at a high velocity, the existence of an increasing variety of data 
sources including social networks, mobile devices, connected things, and open data (weather, 
traffic, maps, etc.), and the challenge of ensuring veracity so that data sources truly represent 
reality (Baesens, Bapna, Marsden, Vanthienen, & Zhao, 2016). The volume, variety, and veracity 
of data make important contributions to predictive model development from which users will more 
likely benefit. In addition, trained prediction models enable data-driven products and services to 
continuously learn and improve on the basis of feedback data from users who share a variety of 
personal data at a high velocity. 





The concept of network effects is predicated on the notion that network externalities give 
rise to value creation through direct connections or multi-sided exchange among individual users 
or different groups of users on opposite sides of the market. As outlined by Katz & Shapiro (1985), 
the utility that a user derives from a platform is a function of the total number of users, as the scale 
of the network gives rise to consumption or network externalities. Using network size as the main 
determinant of user value (Parker & Van Alstyne, 2018; Suarez, 2005), network effects theory 
examines how increases in the network size of one user group may produce a virtuous cycle with 
increases in the network size of either the same user group (direct network effects) or another user 
group, providing complements to the platform (indirect network effects) (Church & Gandal, 1992; 
Church et al., 2008; Katz & Shapiro, 1992; Rochet & Tirole, 2003, 2006; Schilling, 2002). 
However, the broad adoption and diffusion of AI on today’s platforms warrants another 
look at network effects. In particular, it should be noted that “a computer in the middle of every 
transaction” (Varian, 2014, p. 1) does not merely provide connectivity and possibilities for 
exchange among users. It also gives rise to new data networks that platform companies explore 
and exploit with the help of AI. By means of automation or augmentation (Raisch & Krakowski, 
2020), AI enables significant scaling of the learning from the data collected on users as they leave 
digital traces of interconnections with things, people, and organizations in their daily life. Whether 
or not these new processes of data-driven value creation and capture have a positive or negative 
effect on the perceived value for each user of the platform (Stucke & Ezrachi, 2016, 2018; Tucker, 
2019), they give rise to new platform externalities (Himan, 2002) underlying the concept of data 
network effects. The utility that a user derives from a platform is then a function of the scale of 
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data-driven learning and improvements realized with AI. The resulting data network effect, in 
terms of the increase in user value, may manifest in superior (inferior) functionalities of the 
products delivered through the platform, a more (less) personalized and meaningful experience for 
each user, or other aspects of platform quality (see e.g., Cennamo & Santalo, 2013; Cennamo & 
Santaló, 2018; Himan, 2002; Mcintyre & Srinivasan, 2017; Zhu & Iansiti, 2012; Zhu & Liu, 2018). 
Recent work by Afuah (2013) provides a good starting point for exploring these data 
network effects because of the departure from focusing on network size as the only determinant of 
user value. In particular, Afuah (2013) proposes network structure and conduct as additional 
factors that contribute to user value on multisided platforms. For instance, network structure may 
vary in terms of how it contributes to user value through the degree of transaction feasibility. The 
feasibility of transactions depends not only on the existence of connectivity among users but also 
on the availability of data and useful information on the network to achieve the best possible 
matches between supply and demand and to enable each individual user to make more informed 
decisions on entering and executing transactions (Chen & Horton, 2016). Uber, for example, uses 
machine learning algorithms on its platform to analyze data collected on each user in real-time and 
to improve both the algorithmic matching as well as the information and experience offered to 
each user who decides to engage in exchanges among riders and drivers. As this example 
illustrates, the feasibility of transactions also depends on the extent to which each user is actively 
engaged in using the platform or its products and services. To this end, Uber is known for using 
techniques of behavioral nudging to inform and engage users with the help of push notifications 
and messages providing intelligent recommendations that adapt to changing contextual and 
situational circumstances (Rosenblat, 2018). 
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The growing influence of learning from data on the network in the era of AI also becomes 
evident when considering network conduct (Afuah, 2013), another factor contributing to user 
value. For instance, not all users of the network are necessarily rational and have identical 
information about each other and the possible transactions. This may result in opportunistic 
behavior that makes the platform less valuable, on average, to users. For example, some Uber 
drivers may try to game the system by going offline to avoid fulfilling passenger requests that they 
find less lucrative than those received on an alternative ride hailing platform that they use in 
parallel. By learning from data collected on each user through the use of machine learning 
algorithms on the platform, Uber tries to prevent what it views as fraudulent behavior, an instance 
of opportunistic behavior. On the other hand, users of a platform may earn a reputation for being 
trustworthy, dependable, and honest, which may positively impact the contribution of network 
conduct to user value because this reputation serves as a signal to other users and motivates 
exchange. In the example of Uber, drivers and passengers rate each other. A positive five-star 
rating helps a driver obtain repeated jobs, while lower ratings create an important barrier for 
deriving value from the platform. Finally, the perception of trust in the platform, the object of 
exchange or the exchange partners themselves may also play an important role in users engaging 
on the platform and obtaining benefits. In the case of Uber, the behavior and exchange relationship 
between passengers and drivers is governed by the use of machine learning algorithms on the 
platform (Rosenblat, 2018). 
In sum, the underlying mechanism of how data network effects contribute to user value 
influences the network by increasing the scale of learning from the data collected on users through 
the use of AI. To substantiate this claim, we develop a framework addressing our research question 
of how the value for each user of the platform is created from data through AI. 




A FRAMEWORK FOR EXPLORING THE ROLE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
AND DATA NETWORK EFFECTS FOR CREATING USER VALUE 
  Figure 1 shows our framework for explaining the role of AI and data network effects for 
creating user value, defined as the value that users perceive in the platform (e.g., Facebook) or its 
products and services (e.g., News Feed, Pages). The data network effects themselves are 
manifested in the positive direct relationship between the AI capability of a platform and the value 
of the platform as perceived by its users—a relationship that is moderated by platform legitimation, 
data stewardship and user-centric design. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
The framework is based on the following set of assumptions: 
(1) The “computer in the middle of every transaction” (Varian, 2014, p. 1) turns AI-enabled 
platforms into flexible infrastructures that are capable of learning (Assumption 1). For example, 
in addition to employing plenty of human labor, social media sites such as Facebook and Inke, one 
of the largest Chinese live-streaming companies, use machine learning algorithms to help moderate 
(e.g., find and remove) toxic content, including spam, hate speech, nudity, violence, and terrorist 
propaganda. 
(2) The strategic role of machine learning in today’s platforms highlights data as a key 
input into learning and value creation, turning data into a valuable asset (Assumption 2). For 
example, “Facebook, Uber, and Spotify operate technology platforms where their entire value lies 
in the relationships they create and [italics added] the information they hold” (Birkinshaw, 2018, 
p. 204). 
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(3) Consumerization (Gabriel, Korczynski, & Rieder, 2015) has blurred the line between 
consumption and production, turning users into prosumers who cocreate value (Assumption 3). 
For example, content creators on social media platforms such as YouTube simultaneously 
consume and produce marketing content, effectively cocreating value with brands and other 
YouTubers. 
(4) The fact that a few large platform firms (e.g., Facebook, Google) dominate the 
information economy by capturing a disproportionate and growing share of the value (Iansiti & 
Lakhani, 2017) has given rise to concerns about the firms’ massive influence. Indeed, platform AI 
capability alters the behaviors, attitudes, expectations, and emotions of people participating in 
elections, protests, education, and so forth, affecting the interests of a wide range of stakeholders 
often in conflicting ways. This suggests that for long-term success, platform owners must balance 
diverse stakeholder interests (Assumption 4). 
Drawing on this set of assumptions, we explain our framework in the following sections 
(Figure 1). 
Platform AI Capability 
We suggest that the engine driving data network effects is platform AI capability, defined 
as the ability of a platform to learn from data to continuously improve its products and services for 
each user (Assumption 1) (Figure 1). The main mechanism through which platform AI capability 
may enhance perceived user value is by improving prediction (Meinhart, 1966). Prediction 
describes the ability of a system to draw upon existing data about the past and present to generate 
information about the future (Churchman, 1961). This information can help forecast future events 
or provide recommendations for action (Agrawal et al., 2018). For example, a creditworthiness 
decision made by a lending platform involves predicting the likelihood that someone will pay back 
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a loan, drawing upon existing data on users and past transactions. Another example is the detection 
of fraudulent credit card transactions, which increasingly relies on machine learning algorithms 
trained by data scientists and domain experts. 
Prediction enabled by machine learning works through what Herbert A. Simon called 
learning from examples: “A number of systems have been constructed that learn from their own 
problem-solving efforts, or from the successful problem-solving efforts of others in the form of 
worked-out examples of problem solutions” (Simon, 1995, p. 110). For example, to develop a 
reliable fraud detection model as in the example given above, a balanced training dataset with past 
fraudulent and nonfraudulent examples of credit card transactions must be created and fed into the 
machine learning algorithm during training. 
Under certain circumstances, which include training the machine learning algorithms with 
adequate datasets, machine-generated predictions can help avoid human cognitive biases in 
making assessments and forming judgments. For instance, in discussing how to deal with the 
known overconfidence bias in which a person’s subjective confidence in her judgments is greater 
than the objective accuracy of those judgments, Kahneman and Tversky (1977) state the following: 
“The most radical suggestion is to replace such assessments by computation” (p. 4-7). 
Effectively, computations enabled by a platform AI capability can result in higher speed 
and accuracy of prediction (Agrawal et al., 2018). Both types of improvements and their effect on 
the characteristics of network structure and conduct (Afuah, 2013) have to be taken into account 
to understand how platform AI capability impacts perceived user value. 
Speed of prediction. Users participating in the platform’s network are free agents, 
empowered by the use of products and services offered by the platform. For example, a Facebook 
user autonomously decides what to post and when, and an Uber driver decides when, where, and 
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how long to drive and whether to accept or reject ride requests. As a result of the users’ autonomy, 
exchange relationships involving interactions among users are typically bounded in time and 
affected by a myriad of actions taken at this very moment by other users. For example, Twitter 
users may retweet messages within seconds, directly influencing other users to engage or 
disengage in further information exchange on the platform. Such actions may lead to a rapid 
reconfiguration of the network’s structure, which can potentially impede new interactions or 
manifest in opportunistic behaviors by actors pursuing information asymmetries (Afuah, 2013) 
and misinformation campaigns (O’Connor & Weatherall, 2019). 
A platform AI capability offering a greater speed of prediction helps offset such value-
destroying dynamics and foster value-enhancing interactions among users by minimizing the time 
between when a salient change in the network structure or conduct occurs and when the platform 
detects this change and generates user action recommendations to influence the network. Indeed, 
in an ideal scenario, the platform makes instantaneous predictions and anticipates any network 
dynamics that destroy user value based on the state of the network of users at the exact moment a 
given transaction is being carried out. For example, Uber tries to prevent fraudulent behavior such 
as prearranged trips between riders and drivers that limit open competition by letting its algorithms 
monitor signs of fake trips (e.g., requesting, accepting and completing trips on the same device or 
with the same payment profile, excessive promotional trips, excessive cancellations) in real time 
for faster prediction and action recommendations or sanctions to enforce rules more quickly. 
Similarly, Facebook tries to detect misinformation more quickly to prevent false news from 
spreading by employing machine learning algorithms that help identify faster what stories might 
be false or which accounts will more likely post false news before letting human fact-checkers do 
their work to moderate content and increase the perceived value of the platform. 
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Proposition 1a: The greater the speed of prediction, the higher the perceived user value is 
likely to be. 
Accuracy of prediction. As illustrated by the examples given above, the learning enabled 
by platform AI capability not only occurs on the basis of data collected from the network but also 
influences the network by shaping interactions among users. This influence occurs by wrapping 
trained prediction models and machine learning features into the products and services offered by 
the platform, allowing them to function in a smarter and more adaptive way. The resulting agency 
of the platform exerts a strong influence on key network characteristics, including the perception 
of trust among network users and transaction feasibility (Afuah, 2013). As an example of the latter, 
the feasibility of transactions on a platform such as Uber depends not only on the ubiquitous 
availability and constant connectivity of the Internet and smartphones with installed apps but also 
on the availability of information generated through prediction (e.g., pushed information about 
available ride requests on the driver’s way home after a platform work shift). As an example of 
the influence of prediction on trust among interacting users, the information filtering, curation, and 
ranking performed by algorithms on Facebook has at times generated a greater perception of trust 
and at other times a weaker perception of trust in the network, depending on the accuracy of the 
prediction. 
As these examples illustrate, a platform AI capability ensuring greater accuracy of 
prediction helps reduce deviations from what has been forecasted or recommended to what events 
or outcomes have actually occurred or what users truly want, increasing transaction feasibility and 
bolstering the perception of trust among network users. For example, when the Uber platform 
indicates an estimated arrival time of three minutes but it takes the car ten minutes to pick up a 
customer, the value of the platform to this particular user decreases. Similarly, inaccurate forecasts 
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and misplaced action recommendations due to algorithmic biases (Lambrecht & Tucker, 2019), 
for example, may fuel malevolent behaviors and lead to a deterioration of trust in the network. 
Continued difficulties of Facebook algorithms to detect fake news stories offer a good illustration 
of this latter point (Bucher, 2016). 
Proposition 1b: The greater the accuracy of prediction, the higher the perceived user value 
is likely to be. 
Data Stewardship 
Data are oftentimes referred to as the oil fueling the information economy (McAfee & 
Brynjolfsson, 2012; Perrons & Jensen, 2015; Varian, 2014). This suggests that data are a valuable 
asset (Assumption 2), especially when they are used to nurture platform AI capability and help 
ensure value creation for each user. When supplied with sufficient quality and quantity of oil, the 
engine may provide much more value to its users. Similarly, we suggest that the effect of platform 
AI capability on perceived user value is moderated by data quantity and data quality. To ensure 
this strengthening effect, a firm must refine and extract value from data by means of data 
stewardship, defined as the enterprise-wide holistic management of a firm’s data assets to help 
ensure adequate data quantity and quality (Baesens et al., 2016; Cooper, Watson, Wixom, & 
Goodhue, 2000; Kitchens, Dobolyi, Li, & Abbasi, 2018; Otto, 2011; Ross, Weill, & Robertson, 
2006; Wixom & Watson, 2001; Woerner & Wixom, 2015). Data stewardship acts as a mechanism 
of data network effects by helping fuel the engine, making the platform more valuable to each user 
through increased speed and accuracy of prediction (Agrawal et al., 2018). 
To understand the moderating effect of data quantity and quality on the relationship 
between platform AI capability and perceived user value, consider the role of data in machine 
learning, as discussed earlier above. Machine learning algorithms are fed with training data to 
17      
 
 
iteratively adjust predictive models until they produce more accurate and relevant results for the 
users (Agrawal et al., 2018). Training machine learning algorithms with greater amounts of data 
leads to better prediction models (Simon, 1995, 1996) from which users will ultimately benefit. 
However, there are many examples where machine learning algorithms trained on large datasets 
produce inaccurate prediction results (Khoury & Ioannidis, 2014). For example, IBM’s efforts to 
train machine learning algorithms to diagnose cancer and recommend treatment options, including 
their probabilities of success, have been greatly complicated by handwritten notes and local 
acronyms. Accordingly, we suggest that both data quantity and quality need to be considered 
factors as moderating the impact of platform AI capability on perceived user value. 
 Data quantity. Increased accuracy and speed of prediction, the main mechanisms through 
which platform AI capability positively impacts perceived user value, depend on the quantity of 
data used as an input to train and calibrate machine learning models. In their study of human 
prediction, Kahneman & Tversky (1977) distinguish between singular information, i.e., data 
consisting of evidence about a particular case, and distributional information, i.e., base-rate data 
describing the distribution of outcomes across many cases of the same class. A common reason 
for inaccurate predictions by a person is the tendency to rely too much on singular information, 
typically coming from a single case that the person is closely familiar with, and to underweight or 
ignore distributional information. This is called an internal approach to prediction (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1977). To avoid this common bias in prediction, the particular case at hand needs to be 
compared with the distribution of cases of the same class, thus helping avoid biases in the 
interpretation of data. This is called an external approach to prediction (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1977). 
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While computers do not suffer from motivational factors or limited cognitive information 
processing capacities that would make them attached to a particular case (Simon, 1991), the 
internal approach to prediction may still be present in machine learning if the training dataset is 
not large enough and does not contain a sufficient range of cases of the same class. This will likely 
lead to misinterpretation of new cases that the algorithm is confronted with during usage, 
preventing the fast identification of emerging patterns and accurate predictions (Agrawal et al., 
2018). The larger the volume of data about past cases, the greater the ability to build and train 
machine learning algorithms on a strong distributional dataset that facilitates an external approach 
to prediction, thereby increasing the accuracy and speed of prediction. 
For example, DeepMind’s ‘AlphaGo’ system, which beat the former champion Lee Sedol 
in the boardgame called Go, a strategy game similar to chess where each player seeks to enclose 
more territory on the board than the opponent, was trained using vast quantities of examples taken 
from a large number of games played by the best human Go players, allowing the machine to 
optimize its prediction and decision-making capabilities to the extent that its speed and accuracy 
outperformed the best Go player in the world. The limitations of relatively small quantities of data 
for training machine learning algorithms become apparent in another example. Hedge-fund 
investors such as AQR Capital Management are increasingly relying on algorithmic trading, using 
a large variety and volume of data, from credit-card records to satellite images of inventories to 
flight charters for private jets, to make more accurate predictions and more profitable investment 
decisions. Yet the overall size of the data relative to the complexity of the events that these hedge 
fund managers are trying to forecast is still not large enough, highlighting again the importance of 
data quantity as an important moderator of the relationship between platform AI capability and 
perceived user value. 
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Proposition 2a: The higher the quantity of data for the training of machine learning 
algorithms on the platform, the stronger is the relationship between platform AI capability and 
perceived user value. 
Data quality. Increased accuracy and speed of prediction also depend on the quality of 
data used as input for training and calibrating machine learning models. Kahneman & Tversky 
(1977) explain that human predictors typically suffer from an overconfidence bias, whereby their 
certitude concerning a given estimate tends to be higher than that justified by the available 
evidence. This happens due to people’s tendency to form judgments that are consistent with their 
preferences and experience as well as due to the adoption of unverified assumptions and due to 
cognitive anchoring, whereby an individual depends too heavily on an initial piece of information 
offered when making decisions (Kahneman & Tversky, 1977). While these cognitive limitations, 
in principle,  can be overcome by computation and machine learning, avoiding the overconfidence 
bias in prediction requires the use of a dataset that is complete, reliable and appropriate for the task 
at hand (Kahneman & Tversky, 1977). In other words, the data must be of sufficient quality. 
Data quality includes truthfulness (the degree of conformity between the recorded value 
and the actual value), completeness (the extent to which the recorded values exist for all 
observations), consistency (the degree to which the data have been measured in the same manner 
across cases), and timeliness (the speed by which data observations are updated in the event of 
change) (Ballou & Pazer, 1985; Constantiou & Kallinikos, 2015; Markus, 2015; McAfee & 
Brynjolfsson, 2012; Woerner & Wixom, 2015; Yoo, 2015). The better the quality of data, the 
greater is the likelihood of reducing or eliminating the prevalent overconfidence bias in prediction 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1977), thereby strengthening the impact of platform AI capability on 
perceived user value. 
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For example, popular fare aggregators and travel metasearch engines such as Kayak.com 
offer several alternative routes alongside their prices for users to choose from to reach their desired 
destination. Making such recommendations, or prescriptions, requires not only generating a 
prediction for how long a flight sequence might take but also offering an indication of the degree 
of confidence for the recommendation to buy an airfare ticket for the given destination or to wait 
until better rates become available on the platform. The more truthful, complete, consistent and 
timely the dataset that the aggregator platform draws on, achieved, for example, through better 
integration with the reservation systems of airlines and travel agencies, the faster and better are the 
predictions and, thus, also the recommendations offered by the platform to each user. 
Proposition 2b: The higher the quality of data for the training of machine learning 
algorithms on the platform, the stronger is the relationship between platform AI capability and 
perceived user value. 
User-Centric Design 
The perceived value of a fueled engine is likely to be only as strong as the design of the car 
in which the engine is installed because the design shapes the experience of the driver. Similarly, 
platform AI capability trained with adequate quantities and quality of data may help create AI 
models that provide greater speed and accuracy of prediction from which users may perceive value; 
the better that these trained AI prediction models are wrapped into well-designed products and 
services through which users can directly experience the benefits of platform AI capability, the 
stronger the perceived value of the platform AI capability to each user is likely to be. We argue 
that to create value for users, firms designing products and services in the era of AI must adapt to 
consumerization, a process involving the widespread adoption and diffusion of consumer digital 
technologies by people across society (Gregory, Kaganer, Henfridsson, & Ruch, 2018). By 
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empowering users to cocreate value with their personal data, consumerization blurs the line 
between consumption and production (Gabriel et al., 2015), effectively turning users into 
prosumers (Assumption 3). Firms adapt to consumerization by adopting user-centric design, 
defined as becoming closer to users and better understanding their needs to help increase the 
performance and effort expectancy of the products and services. 
User-centric design involves applying “design to get closer to users and better understand 
their needs” (Verganti, 2008, p. 436). By better understanding real user needs and designing the 
platform’s products and services in a way that closely meets their expectations, habits, whims, and 
desires (Gabriel et al., 2015), user-centric design empowers and engages users to cocreate value 
by contributing with their feedback and personal data to the ongoing improvement and tuning of 
AI models and features of the platform. Therefore, user-centric design acts as another key 
mechanism of data network effects by helping users experience the supplied engine and making 
the increased speed and accuracy of prediction afforded by platform AI capability more accessible 
and beneficial to each user. To achieve this outcome, user-centric design must foster user 
engagement. 
One way to conceptualize user engagement on platforms is to consider the intensity with 
which users interact with the platform’s product and services, ranging from complete avoidance 
to skilled and committed use (Klein & Sorra, 1996). Platform businesses typically capture user 
engagement by reporting the number of daily and monthly active users, where “active” 
corresponds to a certain threshold of committed use with regard to a particular product or service. 
A high level of committed use across a broad range of a platform’s products and services makes 
AI-enabled predictions more accurate because it increases the availability of user feedback about 
the outcome (e.g., user chooses option A) following each instance of forecast or prescription (e.g., 
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user is presented with options A, B and C). Every user interaction with a platform offers an 
opportunity to test certain features of a product or service and, therefore, to improve the prediction 
models created by machine learning algorithms to make the user experience more personalized 
and tailored to the unique identity of each user (Adler & Kwon, 2002). For example, the video 
streaming service Netflix runs fifty concurrent experiments per user at any given point in time 
aimed at driving better personalization and continuously developing the feature set of its user 
applications (Gomez-Uribe & Hunt, 2016). We suggest that both the performance expectancy and 
effort expectancy of designed products and services need to be considered as factors moderating 
the impact of platform AI capability on perceived user value by influencing committed use and 
driving user engagement. 
Performance expectancy. To ensure user engagement, the design of the platform’s 
products and services needs to incorporate considerations of performance expectancy. 
Performance expectancy is defined as the degree to which an individual believes that using the 
system will help her or him attain gains in job performance (Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, & Davis, 
2003). Based on Assumption 3, we view the ‘job’ in the context of platforms as a series of tasks 
that the user carries out in a given context by using the platform’s products and services 
(Christensen & Raynor, 2003). The performance will likely be evaluated by users by assessing the 
extent to which they believe that the adoption of the platform’s products and services will help 
them satisfy their needs and meet their expectations while performing their job. Performance 
expectancy is the strongest predictor of the user intention to use the system in both voluntary and 
mandatory settings (Venkatesh et al., 2003) and is therefore a key determinant of committed use 
(Klein & Sorra, 1996), which is the basis for iterative improvements in predictive models created 
by machine learning algorithms based on user feedback (Agrawal et al., 2018). Accordingly, 
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performance expectancy is likely to strengthen the impact of platform AI capability on perceived 
user value. 
For example, consider a scenario where a customer needs to travel in a car from point A to 
point B in the fastest and most convenient way possible under the condition of intense city traffic. 
Waze, a turn-by-turn navigation app, is enabled by a feature called floating car data (FCD), which 
determines the traffic speed on the road network based on a collection of local data, speed, 
direction of travel and time information from mobile phones in vehicles on the road. As this feature 
is wrapped into the app through user-centric design that induces users to use Waze everyday even 
though they may know the way to their destination, the app continuously supplies the underlying 
platform AI capability with new crowdsourced feedback data, helping it improve its predictions 
on an ongoing basis. As a result, Waze is able to increase the perceived value of the platform for 
each user through faster and more accurate rerouting based on changing traffic flows. 
Proposition 3a: The higher the performance expectancy of the platform’s products and 
services, the stronger is the relationship between platform AI capability and perceived user value. 
Effort expectancy. The level of user engagement with a product or service on the platform 
is also a function of effort expectancy, defined as the degree to which an individual user believes 
that using the system would be free of effort (Venkatesh et al., 2003). Similar to performance 
expectancy, effort expectancy also shapes the user intention to adopt the system and, by extension, 
the level of committed use. The easier it is to use a product or service on the platform, the more 
likely it is that users will adopt and use it in a committed way, allowing for further data-driven 
improvement of the underlying AI models and features based on user feedback and creating more 
value for each user. Thus, user beliefs reflecting higher effort expectancy will likely increase the 
24      
 
 
level of committed use of the platform’s products and services, prompting user feedback that is 
necessary to make the AI-enabled predictions more accurate. 
For example, voice assistants such as Apple Siri, Google Now, and Microsoft Cortana 
found a way to combine complex machine learning technology—deep neutral networks, hybrid 
emotional inference models as well as natural language processing and generation—with highly 
accessible user interface designs that rely on voice interaction as a more natural and intuitive way 
for humans to interact with the machines and use products and services on the respective platforms 
of each voice assistant service (e.g., Apple iOS). As a result, the perceived effort expectancy of 
these voice assistant services is very high, contributing to their widespread adoption and engaged 
use, which in turn helps continuously improve predictions and behavior on the basis of user 
feedback data that increases the perceived value of the platform. 
Proposition 3b: The higher the effort expectancy of the platform’s products and services, 
the stronger is the relationship between platform AI capability and perceived user value. 
Platform Legitimation 
A car may be nicely designed and powered by a good engine supplied with sufficient 
quantities of high-quality oil, but people will still only want to use the car if they also consider it 
safe and secure and the perceived risk of an accident as low. Drawing on this analogy, platform 
owners must balance diverse stakeholder interests (Assumption 4) to mitigate the perceived risks 
related to data privacy and security (Cavoukian & Chanliau, 2013; Kroener & Wright, 2014) as 
well as the interpretability and explainability of AI (Coglianese & Lehr, 2019). Building upon this 
assumption, we introduce the third key mechanism of data network effects. We argue that actions, 
including the responsible use of data and ensuring the explainability of AI features, must be 
considered strategic, as they may play an important role in strengthening the relationship between 
25      
 
 
platform AI capability and perceived user value by avoiding accidents such as data security 
breaches, data privacy violations, and unintended consequences of unexplainable machine 
behavior. To capture this category of actions geared toward balancing diverse stakeholder interests 
and mitigating the perceived risks of the use of big data and AI in platform contexts, we introduce 
the concept of platform legitimation, defined as actions that the platform owner takes to ensure 
positive legitimacy evaluations of the platform by key stakeholder audiences. In what follows, we 
explain the moderating role of platform legitimation in our model. 
Legitimacy, defined as “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity 
are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, beliefs, 
and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574), acts as a key determinant of a social entity’s ability to 
acquire resources from the environment (Garud, Schildt, & Lant, 2014; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 
2002). The crucial resources in the case of platforms in today’s era of AI include the personal data, 
financial means, and technological capabilities needed to set up machine learning algorithms, train 
models, and develop new platform features. Accordingly, regulators overseeing the use of personal 
data, platform investors, and technology partners all represent key stakeholder groups whose 
legitimacy judgments must be considered in understanding the functioning of data network effects 
and ultimately the perceived value of the platform by users. 
Satisfying the needs and interests of these key stakeholder groups is important for platform 
owners because they provide critical resources (e.g., sustained access to personal data protected 
by appropriate laws and rules) upon which the continued development and use of their platform 
AI capability depends. The key characteristics of the platform that attract legitimation scrutiny 
from resource-granting stakeholders and that therefore must be proactively addressed as part of 
platform legitimation include (1) how the platform is designed and governed to collect, store and 
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use personal data and (2) how the platform is designed and governed to apply machine learning 
transparently and make predictions explainable. 
Personal data use. A critical aspect of platform legitimation concerns the extent to which 
the platform’s approach to collecting, storing, and sharing personal user data is adjudged by the 
stakeholder audiences to be “the right thing to do” (Suchman, 1995, p. 579). This assessment goes 
beyond self-interested calculations concerning the utility of platform transactions for an individual 
user and involves considerations of moral desirability entertained by a wide range of stakeholders 
across society (Bitektine, 2011). To this end, the platform firm must demonstrate that its policies 
and procedures for data collection and use, typically communicated through user privacy policies 
(Bélanger, 2011; Hong, 2013; Pavlou, 2011; Smith, 2011) and information security compliance 
documents (Anderson & Moore, 2006; Barlow, Warkentin, Ormond, & Dennis, 2018), meet 
morally desirable principles, such as privacy-by-design and security-by-design (Cavoukian & 
Chanliau, 2013; Kroener & Wright, 2014). These by-design principles call for data privacy and 
security to be taken into account throughout the entire engineering and development process and 
for them to be reflected in the design of the platform or specific products and services on the 
platform. The declared policies, procedures, and design choices can then be compared by the 
resource-granting stakeholder audiences with the actual platform outcomes to uncover 
inconsistencies or malfeasance in how the management applies the norms in practice. In case the 
platform design and outcomes are deemed incoherent, the regulators, investors and partners may 
choose to withhold legitimacy and, by extension, resources, forcing the platform to alter or 
altogether eliminate certain AI features or models. 
For example, Uber’s expansion into Europe resulted in a backlash against the company’s 
alleged noncompliance with the regional personal data protection regulations as well as, more 
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broadly, against Uber’s practices in using city transportation data. Facebook, too, has repeatedly 
attracted legitimation scrutiny by key stakeholder audiences, including regulators, investors, and 
partners, over its repeated failures to ensure the privacy and security of user data (e.g., the 
Cambridge Analytica scandal, where the company was able to harvest personally identifiable 
information from the Facebook platform through an app that exploited the Facebook Graph API), 
pointing to limitations in the design and governance of its platform. As a sign of platform 
legitimation and effort to secure support from key stakeholder groups to sustain its scalable 
business model around the use of platform AI capability to create value for billions of users and 
attract advertisers, Facebook has started to endorse data privacy protection rules and to work with 
regulators to secure positive legitimacy evaluations in the future. 
Proposition 4a: The higher the moral desirability of the use of personal data by the 
platform, the stronger is the relationship between platform AI capability and perceived user value. 
Prediction explainability. Another critical aspect of platform legitimation concerns 
explainability, i.e., interpretability of functioning and coherence in understanding, of the 
predictions made by AI models and features on the platform. AI-made predictions not only 
influence core market-related processes on the platform, including how the platform matches 
different user groups, but also have a profound effect on the behavior and emotions of users. As 
resource-granting stakeholders seek an understanding of how and why people are being influenced 
and are affected by these AI-made predictions and the resulting machine behavior or decision 
making, the stakeholders make an assessment as to whether they are meaningful in the context of 
the prevalent beliefs, logics, and categories (Suchman, 1995). Considering the “black box” nature 
of many AI models, which makes it difficult, if not impossible, for humans to understand exactly 
how machine learning algorithms make predictions and arrive at certain decisions, 
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recommendations, or behaviors (Coglianese & Lehr, 2019), making such predictions explainable 
is extremely difficult in some cases (Mayenberger, 2019; Preece, 2018). However, only if the 
explainability of AI-made predictions is achieved can stakeholders assess the meaningfulness of 
these predictions and renew their trust and commitment to grant the critical resources that help 
ensure a strong relationship between platform AI capability and perceived user value (Rossi, 
2018). 
For example, it is becoming increasingly common that banks and lenders use machine 
learning algorithms to predict credit risk and make creditworthiness assessments. The resulting 
loan decisions may have a strong impact on the lives of consumers, but disappointed users typically 
lack an explanation for being denied credit. To increase the perceived user value of AI-enabled 
loan decision making, credit-granting institutions can educate their customers. For instance, Bank 
of America offers all customers their FICO (Fair Isaac Corporation) score and explains the 
important components of the score that are calculated by the algorithms. Thus, fostering 
explainability of predictions made by machine learning algorithms on the platform is likely to 
strengthen the relationship between platform AI capability and perceived user value. 
Proposition 4b: The higher the explainability of predictions made by machine learning 
algorithms on the platform, the stronger is the relationship between platform AI capability and 
perceived user value. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Our research contributes to the literature on network effects (Afuah, 2013; Cennamo & 
Santalo, 2013; Fuentelsaz, Maicas, & Polo, 2012; Gallaugher & Wang, 2002; Liu, Gal-Or, 
Kemerer, & Smith, 2011; Parker, Van Alstyne, & Jiang, 2017; Shankar & Bayus, 2003; 
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Sheremata, 2004; Singh, Tan, & Mookerjee, 2011; Suarez, 2005) by explaining the role of AI 
and data network effects for creating user value, especially in the context of multi-sided 
platforms (Hagiu & Wright, 2015; Mcintyre et al., 2020). Data network effects exhibit a positive 
direct relationship between the AI capability of a platform and the value perceived in the 
platform by its users—a relationship that is moderated by platform legitimation, data stewardship 
and user-centric design. This highlights new platform externalities, where a user’s utility of a 
platform is a function of the scale of data-driven learning and improvements realized with AI, 
complementing user value rooted in network externalities deriving from the scale of the network. 
Integrating our model of data network effects with the extant network effects literature, we argue 
that the utility that a user derives from a platform is increasingly both a function of the scale of 
the network and data-driven learning and improvements realized with AI. This highlights the 
need to examine interactions between network effects and data network effects. 
Our explanation of user value creation in the era of AI offers novel set of insights. First, 
the research describes data network effects as a new category of network effects focused on the 
impact of data-driven learning and improvements, enabled by platform AI capability, on 
perceived user value. Under certain conditions, data network effects play an influential role for 
the value that users perceive in a platform, product, or service. We surmise that data network 
effects largely influence perceived user value in the context of platforms facilitating the 
production and exchange of information or experience goods (Shapiro & Varian, 1999; Varian, 
2014). In such contexts, the user experience is heavily shaped by the scale of learning from data 
collected on users. For example, Google Search is an online service powered by a platform AI 
capability enjoying a high popularity among users due to its capability to continuously improve 
the underlying algorithms and experience of each user as it learns about users and their search 
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queries. Similarly, Netflix leverages data network effects as it collects and analyzes data about 
how its platform is used and then draws on the learning outcomes to continuously improve its 
content and user interface to increase the perceived value of the streaming services offering 
through its platform. Notably, data network effects are even more significant when learning 
capabilities are an important determinant of platform, product, or service quality (Mcintyre & 
Srinivasan, 2017; Zhu & Iansiti, 2012). For example, the user value of a Tesla car’s Autopilot 
functionality is influenced by the firm’s ability to use AI and learn from the data collected from 
sensors, cameras, and radar units in cars to continuously improve the self-driving algorithms and 
Autopilot functionality. 
Second, the value that users perceive in a platform, product, or service may depend on 
combinations of data network effects and direct network effects. Direct network effects describe 
the value that users derive from a network, which comes from users being able to interact directly 
with each other (Katz & Shapiro, 1985; Rochet & Tirole, 2003). In view of the “computer in the 
middle of every transaction” (Varian, 2014, p. 1), these direct exchanges among users are 
increasingly mediated by interactive processes of learning from data collected on each user 
participating in the exchange relationship, highlighting the combined contribution of data network 
effects and direct network efforts to user value. For example, Facebook has historically benefitted 
from strong direct network effects, whereby the value that users derive from the network primarily 
stems from the opportunities of users to interact directly with each other. More recently, however, 
the “self-reinforcing process whereby growth begets growth” (Boudreau & Jeppesen, 2015, p. 
1774) seems to have slowed down, and Facebook has struggled to sustain high-quality interactions 
among users in increasingly crowded social networks. To deal with this challenge and sustain the 
perceived user value of the platform, Facebook has activated and started leveraging data network 
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effects on top of direct network effects by collecting and learning from the vast amounts of 
personal data from its large “N” of users on the network (Farrell & Saloner, 1986; Gandal, 1994; 
Katz & Shapiro, 1985). By applying machine learning techniques and rolling out AI models and 
features, Facebook has tried to influence the network in a desirable direction to increase perceived 
user value. The increase in perceived user value stemming from data network effects feeds back 
into direct network effects, as it increases the number of daily active users, offering more 
opportunities for users to interact directly with each other. 
Third, the value that users perceive in a platform or one of its products or services may 
depend on combinations of data network effects and indirect network effects. Indirect network 
effects focus on the phenomenon that the more people that use a product, the greater is the variety 
and availability of the complements of the product, thereby increasing perceived user value 
(Boudreau, 2012; Church et al., 2008; Clements & Ohashi, 2005). This phenomenon of the demand 
for a product and the supply of complements for that product affecting each other (Stremersch, 
Tellis, Franses, & Binken, 2007) may be influenced by data network effects if the developers of 
complements can use the platform AI capability to learn from data collected on users of the product 
to improve the quality of their complements. For example, Apple rolled out an AI model 
framework for iOS developers (called Core ML), bringing machine learning to smartphone apps 
in its mobile ecosystem. While each user of Apple’s mobile ecosystem benefitted before from 
indirect network effects that resulted in a greater diversity and number of complements of iPhones 
and other iOS devices, these indirect network effects are now strengthened by data network effects, 
as developers are provided by Apple with a platform AI capability that helps them improve their 
apps by performing fast and accurate predictions, potentially increasing the perceived value of the 
complements and overall mobile ecosystem for each user. Examples of such improvements include 
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real-time image recognition, face detection, text prediction, and speaker identification. As an 
increasing number of these kinds of features enabled by Apple’s platform AI capability are 
incorporated into complements of iPhones and other iOS devices, perceived user value is 
increasingly becoming a function of the combination of data network effects and indirect network 
effects. 
Finally, our research indicates the significance of extending the scope of network effects 
research beyond the economics view of platforms (cf. Gawer, 2014). Data network effects relate 
to the technical architecture of the platform, indicating that network effects theory needs to go 
beyond viewing platforms as mere markets (cf. Mcintyre et al., 2020) to effectively study how 
network effects interact with data network effects. The research reported in this paper indicates 
some of the factors that need to be incorporated into our understanding of how network effects are 
empowered by AI technologies (cf. Raisch & Krakowski, 2020). 
For future research, we suggest empirically examining data network effects in the context 
of direct and/or indirect network effects. In doing so, it makes sense to distinguish between positive 
and negative data network effects, similar to the common distinction between positive and negative 
direct or indirect network effects (Parker, Van Alstyne, & Choudary, 2016). The relevance of 
making this distinction is highlighted by the nature of machine learning. Machine learning 
algorithms at work in data network effects learn on the basis of data, yielding unique models of 
prediction and decision making. This phenomenon is also referred to as self-programming, in 
contrast with knowledge-based systems that are explicitly programmed (Meinhart, 1966; Samuel, 
1959). Such self-programming also has disadvantages, including the possibility of algorithmic 
biases (Lambrecht & Tucker, 2019). We therefore suggest distinguishing between positive and 
negative data network effects (cf. Parker et al., 2016). Negative data network effects, where the 
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perceived value of the platform for users decreases, may particularly be activated in the absence 
of high data quality and quantity as well as during breaches of data privacy and security (see model 
in Figure 1). As an example of the former scenario, consider Microsoft’s AI-powered chatbot Tay, 
a Twitter bot that was supposed to learn to engage people through casual and playful conversations 
on social media. Tay rapidly picked up racist and highly abusive language from Twitter users, 
causing a rapid deterioration of perceived user value. As this example illustrates, embedding 
platform AI capabilities in exchange relationships and user networks on multi-sided platforms 
poses considerable risks (Russell, Hauert, Altman, & Veloso, 2015), highlighting the need to 
consider both the intended and unintended consequences of data network effects in future research. 
Future work could also explore the impact of AI and data network effects on the value of 
the platform to the platform owner. By expanding the focus of explanation from perceived user 
value (our model) to value creation and capture, future work could effectively explore the linkages 
between data network effects and competitive advantage. For example, how and why do ‘superior’ 
data-driven AI processes in a firm erode the traditional isolating mechanisms that incumbent 
leaders might have built into an industry?1 One of the most significant isolating mechanisms 
discussed in prior strategic management literature is the firm’s idiosyncratic capacity to learn and 
diversify at the same time (Kor & Mahoney, 2004). In platform AI settings, learning processes are 
data-driven, while diversification oftentimes involves diversifying the platform in a way that 
stimulates new related application areas (Cennamo & Santaló, 2018; Ghazawneh & Henfridsson, 
2013). The platform sponsor’s idiosyncratic capacity to learn from data is enabled by 
complementarities between the platform AI capability and various management, governance and 
design capabilities by the platform organization (see our model); these complementarities, when 
 
1 We thank an anonymous reviewer for providing this suggestion. 
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paired with the relatedness of platform-based products and services, may lead to a generative 
diversification of the platform that becomes increasingly difficult to imitate over time. The extent 
to which this unique isolating mechanism in platform AI settings erodes the traditional isolating 
mechanisms in established industries is likely to depend on the relative role of learning from data 
and information compared to other critical success factors of competition. 
Finally, future research could also explore the interaction between artificial and collective 
intelligence. This may involve studying the usefulness of AI in evaluating solutions from 
crowds, which is particularly relevant when there are many solutions and no one knows what the 
best solution should be (Afuah & Tucci, 2012; Piezunka & Dahlander, 2015). Furthermore, 
understanding how to best organize work by iteratively leveraging artificial and collective 
intelligence, as well as combining them, can help in expediting search processes, completing 
modular and complex work, or helping to identify optimal solutions (Afuah & Tucci, 2012; 
Baldwin & Clark, 2000; Yu & Nickerson, 2011). On the one hand, AI can augment distributed 
problem solving and production models (Kyriakou, Nickerson, & Sabnis, 2017), while on the 
other hand, crowds can support AI systems by providing skills that these systems currently lack 
(Kittur et al., 2013; Von Ahn & Dabbish, 2004). 
IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGERS 
 Managers are well aware that data are the new oil fueling the information economy and 
that data should be treated as a strategic asset (McAfee & Brynjolfsson, 2012; Perrons & Jensen, 
2015; Varian, 2014). Reaping the strategic benefits from data assets requires, in addition to the 
development or acquisition of a superior platform AI capability, careful attention to three key 
mechanisms of data network effects: (1) data stewardship, (2) user-centric design, and (3) platform 
legitimation. In terms of (1), this means ensuring that machine learning algorithms on the platform 
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are fed with appropriate quantities and quality of data and that they employ an enterprise-wide 
approach to the holistic governance of the firm’s data assets. In terms of (2), this means embracing 
consumerization during development to create user-centric designs of products and services on the 
platform that increase performance expectancy (e.g., greater personalization) and effort 
expectancy (e.g., greater ease-of-use). In terms of (3), this means using personal data collected 
from users responsibly by implementing principles of privacy-by-design and security-by-design 
and by ensuring the explainability of predictions generated by AI on the platform. When all these 
mechanisms are successfully activated, users will likely perceive sustainable value in the platform 
AI capability, which may then become a source of competitive advantage. 
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